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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the underlying determinants of home bias using a comprehensive data set on
U.S. investors’ aggregate holdings of every foreign stock. Among those foreign stocks that are not
listed on U.S. exchanges, which account for more than 96 percent of our usable data sample, we find
that U.S. investors prefer firms with characteristics associated with greater information transparency,
such as stronger home-country accounting standards. We document that a U.S. cross-listing is
economically important, as U.S. ownership of a foreign firm roughly doubles upon cross-listing in
the United States. We explore the cross-sectional variation in this “cross-listing effect” and find that
the increase in U.S. investment is greatest for firms that are from weak accounting backgrounds and
are otherwise informationally opaque, suggesting that the key effect of cross-listing is improvements
in disclosure that are valued by U.S. investors. By contrast, cross-listing does not increase the appeal
of stocks from countries with weak shareholder rights, suggesting that U.S. cross-listing cannot
substitute for legal protections in the home country.  Nor does the cross-listing effect appear to be
driven simply by increased “familiarity” with the stock or lowered cross-border transactions costs.
John Ammer




















This paper uses a comprehensive dataset to examine the characteristics that make foreign stocks 
attractive to U.S. investors. Such a study is important because researchers continue to puzzle over the fact 
that U.S. investors exhibit a strong “home bias” for stocks in their own country. Currently, scholars tend to 
favor four explanations for the home bias:  (1) Investors demand a level of informational transparency, 
including high-quality accounting standards, beyond that of the typical non-U.S. stock; (2) Investors value 
the strong legal protections provided by U.S. securities regulations and law; (3) Investors gravitate towards 
stocks that that are most “familiar”; or (4) Investors are inhibited from trading across borders because of 
high transactions costs. We present evidence that supports the first explanation – that transparency is 
important to U.S. investors – and casts doubt on the other three hypotheses.  
Our dataset is derived from security-level U.S. Treasury/Federal Reserve Board surveys of foreign 
equity holdings of U.S. residents, which contains snapshots of all U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign 
equities at specific points in time. We match holdings data from the 1994 and 1997 surveys to firm-specific 
information on publicly traded firms from Worldscope and Datastream, resulting in information on 12,236 
companies domiciled outside of the United States. Using these data, we concentrate on the connection 
between a foreign firm’s decision to cross list on a U.S. stock exchange and U.S. investor interest in 
holding that firm’s stock. Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock [2004], among others, have demonstrated that 
U.S. investors show a distinct preference for holding foreign stocks that are cross-listed in the United 
States, a phenomenon we term the “cross-listing effect.”
1 Our estimates indicate that U.S. ownership in a 
foreign firm doubles upon cross listing. 
We exploit this phenomenon along two dimensions. First, we explore the variation in U.S. 
investment across foreign stocks that are not cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. These firms represent the 
bulk of traded firms outside the United States, and of the 11,755 non cross-listed firms in our sample, more 
than one-quarter attract no U.S. investment. Yet U.S. investors hold at least 20 percent of the market 
                                                       
1 See also Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller [2004], Edison and Warnock [2004], and Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki 
[2005].   2 
capitalization in more than 200 non cross-listed firms, and exhibit clear preferences for stocks with certain 
characteristics. For instance, they tend to hold relatively large stakes in informationally transparent 
companies, including non-financial enterprises, dividend-paying firms, and members of the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World index. More distinctly, U.S. investors favor non cross-listed 
stocks from countries with high average accounting standards and stocks backed by strong accounting 
practices (according to our proxy) at the firm level. Meanwhile, U.S. investors show no preference for 
firms from countries with strong minority investor protections. If anything, they take relatively larger 
positions in firms from countries with weak investor protections, controlling for accounting quality. 
Moreover, U.S. investors show no preference for foreign stocks that are more “familiar,” as measured by 
the company’s degree of international presence.  
Second, we examine directly the reasons why U.S. investors look afresh at cross-listed firms.  We 
use the following intuition:  If cross listing reduces impediments to U.S. investment, then firms with the 
greatest impediments prior to listing should experience the largest jump in U.S. investment. We find that 
firms that use poor accounting practices, or that come from countries with poor average accounting 
standards, experience a statistically larger cross-listing effect than do firms from strong accounting 
backgrounds. This result is consistent with the idea that requisite reconciliations to U.S. GAAP, along with 
other mandated disclosures, make cross-listing firms more attractive to U.S. investors, particularly among 
firms that previously followed poor accounting practices.
2   By contrast, firms with previously weak 
investor protections do not increase their attractiveness by adopting U.S. securities laws. Holding all else 
constant, U.S. investment actually increases more upon cross-listing for firms that are (i) diffusely held and 
(ii) from countries with strong shareholder laws, as if U.S. investors viewed a cross-listing as a complement 
                                                       
2 Foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges are required to annually file SEC form 20-F, which contains a reconciliation 
of the firm’s net income and shareholders’ equity figures with U.S. GAAP. Researchers have questioned the value of 
these reconciliations relative to the reporting of U.S. firms (e.g., Rees and Elgers [1997], Pownall and Schipper 
[1999], and Lang, Ready, and Wilson [2006]), but have generally found the reporting of cross-listed firms to be more 
informative than that of their non cross-listed peers (e.g., Lang, Raedy, and Yetman [2003], Lang, Lins, and Miller 
[2003], Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], and Barth, Landsman, Lang, and Williams [2006]).   3 
to other protections for minority shareholders, rather than a substitute.
3   These results have interesting 
implications for “bonding” theories of cross-listing (Stulz [1999] and Coffee [1999, 2002]), which we 
return to below. Holding all else constant, we also observe no difference in investor interest in less-familiar 
versus more-familiar stocks upon cross-listing.  
Finally, cross-border trading costs are unable to explain differences in U.S. interest across foreign 
stocks. U.S. investors hold about the same proportion of foreign stocks that are traded over-the-counter 
(OTC) in the United States as they do in peers not traded in the United States. Foreign firms whose stocks 
trade OTC are interesting because they save the U.S. investor the cost of a cross-border transaction but are 
not compelled to register with the SEC or reconcile financials with U.S. GAAP. More compellingly, we 
find that U.S. investors acquire a majority of their shares in cross-listed firms directly in the firm’s home 
market, rather than through purchases of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on a U.S. exchange.  Thus, 
the availability of foreign shares for trading within U.S. borders, by itself, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for explaining the cross-listing effect. 
We obtain our results using econometric methodologies that account for the underlying 
endogeneity between U.S. holdings behavior and the decision to cross-list on a U.S. exchange. We first 
jointly model the cross-listing and holding decisions as a system of simultaneous equations, using the 
methodology from the study of unionization and wages by Lee [1978]. This framework not only allows us 
to correct for the effects of selection bias, but also produces structural estimates of the relation between 
holding and listing. But because no single econometric methodology can be expected to perfectly account 
for endogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus [2005]), we buttress the parametric results with semi-parametric 
propensity score matching and non-parametric “difference-in-differences” methods for selection-bias 
adjustment.     
Our paper is related to recent work examining the decision to cross-list, and the benefits that accrue 
from cross-listing. Lang, Lins, and Miller [2003] document increases in forecast accuracy and analyst 
                                                       
3 Our results do not imply that American investors favor companies with poor firm-level investor protections. Indeed, 
Leuz, Lins, and Warnock [2006] show that where country-level investor protections are poor, U.S. holdings are lower 
in companies with poor corporate governance.   4 
coverage of firms following a cross-listing, and show that these firms are valued more highly, on average, 
than their non cross-listed peers.  They attribute the valuation gains to the improved information 
environment following the cross-listing.
4 Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004] study cross-listed firms’ 
market-to-book ratios and find the valuation changes around a U.S. cross-listing to be higher for firms 
domiciled in countries with weak investor protections. They argue that the higher valuations are a result of 
improved legal protections. Doidge [2004] studies changes in control premiums around U.S. cross-listings 
and attributes a decline in the average premium to reductions in private benefits of control associated with 
improved legal protections.
5  In contrast to these studies, our paper focuses on holdings of foreign stocks, 
and changes in the quantity of holdings around a cross-listing, which may yield insights unavailable from 
stock price data. U.S. investors are unlikely to be the marginal investor in many of the firms in our sample, 
so their portfolio decisions are likely to have limited influence on the firm’s stock price. Yet, observing 
how they change their positions in these firms might provide important guidance on how foreign firms 
attract outside capital. 
The paper most closely related to our own is Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller [BBM, 2004]. BBM 
use U.S. institutional holdings of foreign companies as reported in SEC 13(f) filings to examine the relation 
between investor interest in foreign companies and accounting choice. Utilizing both cross-sectional and 
time-series methods, they find that foreign firms with greater conformity to U.S. GAAP attract more U.S. 
institutional interest. Our paper builds on the results of BBM in two important ways. First, our sample is 
drawn from a survey covering all U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign equities. By contrast, SEC 13(f) 
requires only the reporting of U.S. holdings in foreign securities that trade on U.S. exchanges. This 
excludes holdings in all non-cross listed stocks as well as in the home-traded stocks underlying cross-listed 
                                                       
4 See also Foerster and Karolyi [1999], Miller [1999], and Errunza and Miller [2000], who document positive stock 
price reactions to firms that cross-list on a U.S. exchange. 
5 Gozzi , Levine, and Schmukler [2005] question the relation between stock valuations and motivations for cross-
listing, with a particular emphasis on interpretations related to legal protections. They show that the increases in 
valuation occur well before the cross-listing and decline in the year after the cross-listing, and find no relation between 
valuation changes around cross-listing and country-level investor protections. They argue that the observed pattern is 
more consistent with valuation increases leading to corporate expansions through cross-listing than changes in legal 
protections.   5 
ADRs. Thus, the BBM sample covers only a small segment of the securities available to U.S. investors, and 
understates U.S. holdings in the firms covered in their sample. Second, our investigation attempts to 
disentangle the information-transparency explanation for U.S. investor interest from competing (but 
correlated) explanations of the home bias. Specifically, our paper distinguishes between two dimensions of 
the theory popularly known as the “bonding” hypothesis (Stulz [1999]; Coffee [1999, 2002]).  
Bonding theories assert that international firms can improve corporate their governance standards 
by cross listing in the United States in order to bond themselves to U.S. accounting, disclosure, and legal 
practices. The first dimension of the bonding hypothesis relates to the perception that accounting and 
disclosure practices within the Unites States provide valuable information to investors at a lower cost than 
systems in other countries (Ball [2001]; Bushman, Piotrowski, and Smith [2004]). The second dimension is 
associated with the relatively strong legal protections investors receive in the United States through the 
enforcement of corporate and securities laws that protect minority investors, and backed by extensive 
property rights and contract law (Coffee [2002]; Levine [2005]). The two dimensions are likely to be 
correlated because countries with sound accounting and disclosure systems are likely to also have strong 
legal institutions in place to enforce compliance with the systems. However, valuable information 
production does not require strong legal backing; competitive concerns or reputation may be incentive 
enough to maintain compliance with a given level of reporting standards (Ball, Robin, and Wu [2003]; 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003]; Siegel [2005]). Our results suggest that U.S. investors value the 
production of high-quality information without necessarily putting weight on explicit protections provided 
through the U.S. legal system.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data used in the paper. Section 3 
presents and estimates a simultaneous equations model of the cross-listing and holdings decisions. Section 
4 describes the methodologies we use for estimating the average cross-listing effect and reports results, 
both for the average cross-listing effect and the firm-level regressions used to explore what drives the 
cross-listing effect. Section 5 concludes.   6 
2. Data  
2.1 Benchmark Survey Data 
Our investigation begins with comprehensive security-level data on U.S. holdings of foreign stocks 
as of December 31, 1997, obtained confidentially through benchmark surveys conducted jointly by the U.S. 
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board.  Later, we also use data from the predecessor March 
1994 survey. The survey must be completed by all U.S. financial institutions, both within the United States 
and abroad, that are entrusted with the management or safekeeping of client equity holdings. Institutions 
covered include all U.S. custodian banks, other commercial and investment banks, mutual funds, pension 
funds, insurance companies, endowments, and foundations. Respondents are required to report the foreign 
stock and bond holdings of all their clients that are U.S. residents, and are subject to penalty under law for 
noncompliance.
6   
The survey is the source for official U.S. data on cross-border portfolio investment.
7  It is designed 
to pick up all recorded U.S. resident portfolio holdings of foreign equities. The only portfolio investments 
missed by the survey are “uncountable” holdings – i.e., those that evade detection because the U.S. resident 
used a foreign custodian, provided a foreign home address, or instructed the custodian not to employ a U.S. 
sub-custodian. Federal Reserve cross-checks with non-U.S. data collectors suggest that the number of 
uncountable holdings is small.  
Other data sources are necessarily more limited. For example, data on U.S. institutional investors’ 
holdings as reported to the SEC on Form 13(f), and used by BBM, exclude holdings in securities that do 
not trade in U.S. markets, and in foreign securities that underlie ADRs. A small fraction of publicly traded 
firms domiciled outside of the United States actually trade in U.S. markets (3.5 percent in 1997, according 
                                                       
6 Custodians are the main source of information, covering 97 percent of the market value of the securities in the 1997 
survey. Institutional investors report in detail on their ownership of foreign securities only if they do not entrust the 
safekeeping of these securities to U.S.-resident custodians. If they do use U.S.-resident custodians, institutional 
investors report only the names of the custodians and the amounts entrusted. 
7  “Portfolio investments” exclude holdings for control purposes, defined to be individual holdings of 10 percent or 
more of shares outstanding. Excluding these large holdings is likely to have little impact in our sample because it is 
relatively uncommon for a single U.S. investor to hold more than 10 percent of a publicly traded foreign company. 
Griever, Lee, and Warnock [2001] provide a primer on the survey. Complete details of the 1997 survey, including 
forms, instructions, and data, are available from http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/fpis.html.   7 
to the U.S. Treasury/Federal Reserve survey), and among those that do trade within U.S. borders, U.S. 
investors hold more than half of their ownership in the underlying security, not through ADRs. Thus, Form 
13(f) filings cover only a small segment of the securities available to U.S. investors, and underestimate U.S. 
holdings in the firms covered in their sample. By simple comparison, 13(f) data appear to suggest that U.S. 
investors have holdings in only 5 percent of non-U.S. firms (see Table 2 of BBM), whereas our data 
registers U.S. ownership in over 70 percent of non-U.S. firms. An additional problem with the 13(f) data is 
that holdings of foreigners can be intermingled with U.S. holdings because the SEC permits (but does not 
encourage) institutions to consolidate their 13(f) holdings across subsidiaries, including foreign ones.    
2.2 Sample Selection 
We limit our investigation to U.S. holdings of non-U.S. companies tracked by Worldscope. This 
enables us to utilize the company financial and accounting information reported in Worldscope, and 
provides us with International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs) for each of the company’s 
outstanding securities. Obtaining the ISINs allows us to link more easily with other electronic databases, 
such as Datastream. We use the May 1999 release of Worldscope, which contains 1997 data on 13,445 
non-U.S. companies domiciled in 52 different countries.  
In our tests, we normalize firm-level U.S. holdings by measures of the market capitalization 
(market value of equity) of the company. Datastream, which provides the broadest international coverage 
of market price data, is our primary source for firm-level market capitalizations. When a value is missing in 
Datastream, we turn to reports from Morgan Stanley, which provide reliable market data for companies 
included in the MSCI All-country World index, or Worldscope, which provides December market 
capitalizations for those companies that complete their fiscal year at the calendar year-end. We also use 
Morgan Stanley and Worldscope to cross-check the Datastream numbers for recording errors. In total, we 
are able to calculate market capitalization figures for 12,236 of the original 13,445 Worldscope firms.  
We define two different measures of firm-level U.S. investor holdings. The first measure is 
constructed as the ratio of dollar holdings in a stock to the firm’s market capitalization, and is thus 
equivalent to the proportion of shares held by U.S. residents. Our second measure uses a different   8 
denominator, an estimate of the stock’s “market float,” the market value of shares that are not closely held 
by insiders. Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson [2003] argue that such closely held shares are 
unlikely to be made available to outside investors, because insiders receive benefits from control that are 
not reflected in a stock’s price. We calculate market float by scaling market capitalization down by the 
figure given in Worldscope’s “closely held share” field, which reports the fraction of equity owned by 
corporate officers, directors and their family members, individual shareholders with more than 5 percent 
holdings, other corporations, and by the firm’s own pension funds and trusts. However, we first adjust these 
Worldscope figures to exclude the value of depositary institution holdings, which are sometimes 
mistakenly counted in the closely held fields.
8  Because of missing data on insider holdings, we can 
calculate market float for only 8,528 of our original observations. 
2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the aggregate U.S. holdings share for firms in each of the 46 countries represented 
in our sample.
9  Even at the national level, U.S. holdings shares vary considerably. As of the end of 1997, 
U.S. investors owned nearly a quarter of the market capitalization of Argentine firms, and about a fifth of 
the market in Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Mexico.
10  Meanwhile, Americans held just 9 
percent of the market capitalization for the 46 countries in aggregate, and less than 5 percent of Belgium, 
Greece, China, Colombia, and Taiwan. U.S. investor holdings also were relatively dispersed within the 46 
countries, with non-zero stakes in 8,785 of the 12,236 stocks in the sample, ranging from very small firms 
to the world’s largest non-U.S. companies. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our market capitalization and market float samples. The 
                                                       
8 Specifically, we exclude holdings by the Bank of New York, Morgan Guarantee Trust, and Citibank, because these 
shares are likely to be holdings for ADR programs, and the New Zealand Central Securities Depositary. There are 
other reasons to believe that the Worldscope measure of insider holdings contains measurement error. Worldscope 
coverage of the “closely held shares” field is uneven, and reporting requirements differ across countries. Moreover, it 
is unclear whether the classifications within Worldscope of what constitutes a closely held share conform well to 
theory on who gains private benefits from control and who would be willing to sell to a U.S. investor. For example, 
the measure includes holdings of large, unaffiliated blockholders. 
9  We exclude six countries with some Worldscope coverage but minimal U.S. holdings:  Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Slovakia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. Worldscope has 1997 data for a total of 42 firms from these countries. 
10 Countries that have a high share of U.S. ownership tend to have more cross-listed firms (Ahearne, Griever, and 
Warnock [2004]) and less pervasive insider holdings (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock [2006]).   9 
Worldscope-based sample of 12,236 firms had an end-1997 market capitalization of $11,080 billion, 
representing more than 90 percent of the value of all non-U.S. equity (International Finance Corporation, 
[1998]). U.S. investors’ $1,020 billion stake in these companies accounted for 88 percent of total U.S. 
foreign equity holdings and 9.2 percent of the market capitalization of the companies.  On a market float-
adjusted basis, U.S. investors held 13.5 percent of the Worldscope companies. As noted by Dahlquist, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson [2003], the market-float adjustment can account for part of the observed 
home bias in U.S. holdings.  
Table 2 also breaks down the sample according to whether or not the sample firms are cross-listed 
on a U.S. exchange, defined to include both direct listings and ADRs listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, or American Stock Exchange.
11  Of the 12,236 sample firms, 498 were 
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange at the end of 1997. U.S. investors held an (equal-weighted) average of 17.5 
percent of the market capitalization (26.3 percent of market float) of these firms, compared to an average 
stake of just 2.9 percent (5.6 percent of market float) of the 11,738 foreign companies that were not cross-
listed. This large difference in U.S. holdings of cross-listed and non cross-listed foreign firms forms the 
basis for what we term the “cross-listing” effect. 
Among cross-listed firms, U.S. investors held the bulk of their holdings (11.1 percent of market 
capitalization) in the underlying security purchased in the foreign home market. This fact has an important 
implication. ADRs enable U.S. investors to forego concerns about trading in other currencies, dealing 
directly with foreign regulatory authorities, and potentially high execution costs on foreign stock markets. 
If investors were responding merely to the convenience of being able to trade these stocks in the United 
States we would expect most of the cross-listed holdings to be in the form of ADRs. In contrast, most U.S. 
holdings in cross-listed firms are in the underlying foreign security. 
                                                       
11 An ADR is a traded financial claim backed by a set number of equity shares in the underlying company. ADRs are 
created when firm initiates a relationship with a broker that buys the firm’s shares and instructs a U.S. financial 
institution, called a “depositary,” to hold the shares in custody and issue negotiable securities backed by the shares, the 
“receipts,” to an interested investor. Only “Level II” and “Level III” ADRs list and trade on one of the major U.S. 
stock exchanges.  
   10 
The bottom of Table 2 includes information on U.S. ownership in foreign equities that trade as 
“Level 1” ADRs. These shares are traded in dollars in the United States, but over-the-counter. Because they 
are not listed on a major U.S. exchange, Level 1 ADRs are not required to reconcile financial statements 
with U.S. GAAP, or to disclose regularly with the SEC, and are not liable under most U.S. securities laws. 
For much of our analysis, we treat these firms as non cross-listed firms. U.S. investors do hold a greater 
proportion of shares in a Level 1 ADR-firm (8.1 percent of market capitalization, 14.6% of market float) 
than in the average foreign firm not traded in the United States, mostly in the form of the underlying 
foreign security. However, as discussed at the end of Section 4, most of the difference between the holdings 
of foreign companies with Level 1 ADRs and non U.S.-traded foreign companies can be explained by 
selection bias.
12   
 
3.  Simultaneous model of the cross-listing and holdings decisions 
To examine more closely the characteristics that make foreign stocks attractive to U.S. investors, 
we estimate a simultaneous system of three structural equations that separately model: (1) U.S. holdings in 
cross-listed firms, (2) U.S. holdings in non cross-listed firms, and (3) a foreign firm’s decision to cross-list 
in the United States. We use the system to control for potential endogeneity problems that might bias the 
holdings estimates. For instance, estimates relating firm characteristics to U.S. holdings will be biased by 
selection if a firm’s propensity to cross-list on a U.S. exchange is correlated with other characteristics of the 
firm that affect U.S. investors’ holding decisions. Moreover, firms might cross-list in the United States for 
the specific purpose of increasing U.S. investor interest; thus the causation between cross-listing and U.S. 
holdings could run in both directions.   
3.1 Modeling the holdings and cross-listing decisions 
We adapt the structural framework developed originally by Lee [1978] for a study of unionization 
and wages, which extends the Heckman [1979] selection-bias correction to a simultaneous system that 
                                                       
12  Indeed, many Level 1 ADR programs have been initiated by U.S. investors or depository banks, not by the foreign 
companies themselves. Thus, it is not surprising that sample selection adjustments account for most of the increased 
holdings in the Level 1 ADRs.   11 
allows feedback from bias-adjusted holdings equations to the cross-listing decision.  





i H e + + a = L
L





i e + + a = U
U
i ￿ Z                 (2) 
We separately model the holdings of cross-listed (
L
i H ) and non-cross listed stocks (
U
i H ) to 
recognize that decisions to hold these two types of stocks can be fundamentally different.  This not only 
provides more flexibility in estimation, but also can help identify the structural parameters. Note that 
observations of
L
i H are 
U
i H are truncated by selection since, at a given point in time, we can only observe a 
firm as cross-listed or not.  That is, we cannot observe the counterfactual holdings in firm i.  One way to 
think about our structural framework is that it fills in these gaps by estimating the counterfactual 
observations.  




i Z Z   and   contain firm- and country-level proxies for a variety of factors that 
could influence the willingness of U.S. investors to invest in a foreign firm.  We divide the variables into 
three groups, and relate the groupings to prevailing theories of international investment.   
First, U.S investors may want fundamental information about a foreign stock before deciding to 
purchase it. The ability to obtain information about a company will depend, among other things, on the 
accounting and disclosure practices of the company. Therefore, U.S. investors may favor companies that 
provide an accurate and timely accounting of their financial performance (Leuz and Verrecchia [2004]; 
BBM), and may be attracted to foreign stocks domiciled in countries with forthright accounting practices 
(Lang, Lins, and Miller [2003]).  
To measure these effects, we first consider five proxies for information transparency. The first 
proxy is the logarithm of total (book) assets. Larger firms are generally believed to be more transparent 
than smaller firms, in part because they tend to get more coverage both from the press and from securities 
analysts. The second is a financial firm dummy. Financial firms hold assets that could be more difficult to   12 
value than those of non-financial firms, are subject to more regulatory, rather than public disclosure, and 
may view public information disclosures as potentially risky to their business.
13   Third, we add a Canada 
dummy. Institutional similarities and ties within North America may make Canadian firms more 
transparent to U.S. investors. Fourth, we include a MSCI member dummy. MSCI index members are 
selected on the basis of liquidity, size, and market representation. Illiquidity can reflect asymmetric 
information (e.g., Easley and O’Hara [2004]) that would put U.S. investors at a disadvantage. Our fifth 
proxy is an English home language dummy. U.S. investors may find it easier to process information from 
companies that are guaranteed to disclose information in English.  
  As more direct measures of the ability to obtain information about a company, we include two 
measures of accounting quality. The first measure is the national accounting quality index compiled by the 
Center for Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). As reported by Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 
[2004], the index averages across firms within a given country the number of items, out of a possible 
maximum of 90, that are included as part of a firm’s financial statements. The second measure is a firm-
level accounting quality index, constructed as the sum of four indicator criteria:  The first criterion takes the 
value of one if a company uses a Big Six auditor; the second criterion equals one if the company received a 
clean audit report. The third takes a value of one if the firm used international accounting standards or US 
GAAP. And the fourth equals one if the firm reported consolidated statements. This variable measures 
variation in firm-specific accounting quality not picked up by the national accounting quality variable. 
Second, U.S. investors may care about the safety of their investment in the hands of managers who 
operate outside U.S. borders. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1999, 2002] document 
substantial cross-country variation in how well legal systems protect outside shareholders from 
expropriation by firm insiders. Durnev and Kim [2005], among others, show that the quality of corporate 
governance within a country can vary greatly across firms. Thus, U.S. investors could tilt their investments 
toward countries with strong legal protections of minority investors and seek out firms with a reputation for 
good corporate governance. We include three measures that capture governance/legality issues. The first is 
                                                       
13 For evidence on the opaqueness of financial firms, see Morgan [2002].   13 
the proportion of shares held by insiders. Investors may shy away from firms that are closely held, fearing 
the power of insiders to expropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders.
14  The second is 
a dummy for dividend-paying firms. A company’s dividend-paying record can be viewed as a commitment 
device, with the willingness to dispense cash signaling a commitment not to expropriate funds from 
minority shareholders.
15  The third is the country’s shareholder rights index.  U.S. investors may choose to 
underweight firms from markets with weak protections of minority shareholders.
16 
Third, U.S. investors in foreign stocks may gravitate toward firms with products that are familiar. 
Huberman [2001], Barber and Odean [2003], Ackert, Church, Tomkins, and Zhang [2003], Kaniel, Li, and 
Starks [2003], and Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston [2004] present evidence suggesting that investor 
purchases of equity can depend on simple name recognition arising through product endorsements and 
branding, advertising, news coverage, or even abnormal trading volume. These papers attribute investment 
in familiar stocks to a behavioral motivation that is distinct from seeking better information about stock 
fundamentals.
17  To proxy for familiarity we use foreign sales (as a proportion of total sales). Companies 
that do substantial foreign business might be more recognizable to U.S. investors through advertising, the 
media, and direct consumer purchases.  
Some of our variables can serve dual roles. For example, size and the MSCI and Canada dummies, 
which we present as information variables, also proxy for familiarity. In addition, we also include some 
more general control variables. We include the firm’s market-to-book value. We take low market value to 
be a rough indicator of financial distress, which tends to increase conflicts of interests among stakeholders 
in the firm in a way that might be particularly problematic for cross-border minority investors. We also 
                                                       
14 For evidence demonstrating that outside investors avoid ownership in closely held companies, see La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1999], Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2000], and Leuz, Lins, 
and Warnock [2006]. 
15 See Faccio, Lang, and Young [2001], Kalcheva and Lins [2004], Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson [2006], 
Easterbrook [1984], and Jensen [1986]. 
16 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998].  
17 However, the term “familiar” has also been used to refer to how well-informed investors are about particular stocks. 
Merton’s [1987] paper on expanding investor base required that new investors “learn” the first two moments of a 
stock’s return. Moreover, Coval and Moskowitz [1999, 2001] and Ivkovic and Weisbenner [2005] study geographic 
preferences for holding stock and argue that investors “buy local” because they are better informed about companies 
that are close to where they live. In this context, familiarity implies that rational investors select stocks for which they 
have good information.      14 
include a country’s dividend tax withholding rate faced by U.S. investors. Withholding taxes can cause 
U.S. investors to face higher tax rates on dividends originating from a given foreign country than on U.S. 
stock dividends. This would make stocks from the foreign country less attractive to U.S. investors, 
particularly if other potential investors in stocks from the two countries did not face the same tax rate 
differential (otherwise, prices could adjust to equilibrate after-tax expected returns). Often a U.S. investor 
can obtain a tax credit that fully offsets a dividend tax that has been withheld by a foreign government. 
However, U.S. pension funds are not taxed directly on dividends, so tax credits are of no use to them, and 
thus taxes charged on foreign dividends generally will represent a differential between the foreign and 
domestic dividend tax rates that U.S. pensions face (the domestic rate is zero). Thus at least one important 
investor group is clearly affected by dividend withholding tax rates.  
The second part of the simultaneous system involves a firm’s decision to cross-list on a U.S. 
exchange. We motivate the decision by considering the potential benefits and costs of cross-listing. 
Let   X  
*
i represent the net benefits that flow to firm i from cross-listing on a U.S exchange. We assume that 
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i H   -   H models the anticipated impact of listing on U.S. holdings. It is included in (3) to 
allow for foreign firms to cross-list in the United States precisely because it attracts greater U.S. investor 
interest. 
U
i H also enters equation (3) independently to allow the level of U.S. holdings prior to cross-listing 
to affect a firm’s decision to cross-list. We posit that firms with large pre-existing U.S. shareholdings could 
cross-list on a U.S. exchange to reduce trading costs for their shareholder base.  
The vector
X
i Z contains other firm- and country-specific variables that are associated with benefits 
and costs of cross-listing, but that are taken to be exogenous.  There are both direct and indirect costs 
associated with listing in the United States that could make firms reluctant to cross-list. Most cross-listed   15 
firms face a host of direct registration, disclosure, and compliance costs. They must register with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and submit periodic filings that are in English and include 
financial statements reconciled to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). They must meet 
the listing requirements of the U.S. exchange, which are often stricter than those in the firms’ home 
country, and pay both listing fees to the exchange and filing fees to the SEC. Firms that cross-list to raise 
new capital must also register their securities under the SEC 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange 
Act. Indirect costs include the commitments that cross-listed firms make to abide by U.S. regulations and 
law. Firms that violate exchange regulations risk fines and the threat of delisting. Those that violate SEC 
regulations face potential shareholder lawsuits and civil or criminal penalties under U.S. law. Closely held 
firms may be especially reluctant to cross-list if the increased level of disclosure and legal oversight gives 
more power to minority shareholders. 
The benefits of cross-listing varies across firms and can include product market considerations (to 
the extent that listing on the NYSE can help make a foreign company a household name in the United 
States), employee compensation (to the extent that it includes grants of options or stock), and takeover 
strategy (where a cross-listed stock can serve as a takeover currency). One potential benefit that both 
practitioners and theorists cite as a reason for cross-listing is to increase the set of investors that can, at low 
cost, access information and trade shares in the firm. That is, cross-listing reduces “receiver” costs 
associated with expanding the shareholder base (Merton, [1987]).
18  This in turn may improve risk sharing, 
pricing, and the liquidity of a firm’s stock. Accordingly, firms seeking to expand their shareholder base 
through increased U.S. ownership might have the strongest incentive to cross-list. Firms may also list in the 
U.S. to reduce institutional frictions associated with maintaining their existing investor base. For example, 
if a firm already has U.S. investors, it may cross-list to make it easier for those investors to manage their 
                                                       
18 Lang, Lins, and Miller [2003] argue that foreign firms may cross-list simply to expand their “shareholder base”, the 
set of investors available to purchase a given firms’ shares. See also Merton [1987], Miller [1999], Foerster and 
Karolyi [1999], Karolyi and Stulz [2003], and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004]. The argument is also popular among 
U.S. practitioners who encourage foreign clients to cross list. See Fanto and Karmel [1997], and the ADR websites at 
JPMorgan (www.adr.com/research/about_types.html) and the Bank of New York (www.adrbny.com).  
   16 
stock portfolios. But the other considerations (product market, compensation, takeover currency) might be 
more important: Any consideration that involves expanding the shareholder base must be weighed against 
that of relinquishing any private benefits of control. 
Some of the variables that impact holdings decisions are already included in our system because 
they also likely influence the cross-listing decision. The proportion of shares held by insiders proxies for 
the cost of relinquishing private control benefits through increased disclosure and monitoring associated 
with cross-listing (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz [2004]). Firm size will be important for the listing decision if 
there are economies of scale in the direct costs of listing, including regulatory compliance and accounting 
disclosure. We include the financial firm dummy for two reasons. First, the direct costs of cross-listing for 
financial firms may be higher, because accounting principles for financial instruments and contracts tend to 
be among the most complicated and contentious. Second, indirect costs may also be greater, if financial 
firms are wary of the impact of public information disclosures on their businesses, and so they might be 
less eager to cross-list. We include the Canada dummy because cross-listing should be less costly for 
Canadian firms because Canadian firms enjoy an exemption from most SEC reporting requirements.
19 
Finally, we posit that firms from countries with weak accounting standards will find it more costly to 
prepare financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.  
In addition, we include two variables that are unique to the cross-listing specification:  home-
country trading volume/GDP (because the benefits from cross-listing might be particularly high for firms 
that quickly “outgrow” their underdeveloped home equity markets) and a Germanic language dummy 
(because the direct costs of complying with U.S. regulations may be lower for managers who are more 
comfortable with the English language).  
3.2 Estimating the model  
We do not observe 
*
i X  in equation (3). Instead, we observe realizations of the indicator variable Xi,   
                                                       
19 Under the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) agreement between the SEC and the Canadian Securities 
Administration, Canadian firms can cross-list on a U.S. exchange without conforming to U.S. GAAP and with only 
minimal reporting to the SEC.   17 
  0 X   if   0 X
*
i i < =                 (4) 
.   0 X   if   1 X
*
i i ³ =                 (5) 
Xi equals one when firm i is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange, and zero otherwise. Note that equations (3), 
(4), and (5), coupled with an assumption that the error term 
X
i e  is normally distributed, imply that the 
listing decision can be estimated using a probit model. 
Taking into account selectivity adjustments, U.S investor preferences for holding cross-listed and 
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i take on the additional interpretation of being the estimated holdings in firm i when the 
firm is cross-listed and when it is not, while ￿ and ￿ denote the probability density and cumulative density 
functions of the standard normal distribution. Equations (3), (6), and (7) now constitute a system of 
equations which can be estimated with maximum likelihood techniques.  The estimation procedure is 
discussed in the appendix.  We note here only that the coefficients on ￿ in (6) and (7) are the inverse Mills 
ratio, which forms the basis for standard corrections for selectivity bias when inclusion in an estimation 
sample is contingent on a discrete outcome (see Heckman [1979] or Maddala [1983]), and a similar but less 
frequently used correction for selectivity bias for the non-selected observations. 









i H   and   H  are scaled (by market capitalization or market float) to only take on values between zero and 
one, we work off of transformations of equations (6) and (7). These transformations, along with other 
details of the estimation process, are described in the appendix.   18 
Identification of the model parameters depends on our ability to find at least some variables that 
directly determine one of the two endogenous variables, but not the other. We hypothesize that the two 
unique variables in the cross-listing equation, home-country trading volume/GDP and the Germanic 
language dummy importance of a stock market within a country, uniquely identify the cross-listing 
decision.   A firm’s trading volume in its home market, measured relative to the country’s size, should not 
influence U.S. investor preferences for holding stocks from that country. However, a company operating 
within a country may “outgrow” its home market if that market is relatively small, meaning that the size or 
activity of the home market could directly influence a firm’s incentives to cross-list. A firm from a 
Germanic-language country should find it easier to produce documents in English, but U.S. investors 
should show no strong distinct preference for investing in these firms. 
 Conversely, a country’s dividend tax policy, or whether or not it has a tax treaty with the United 
States, should not influence a firm’s decision to list here, beyond the implied impact that the policy would 
have on holdings. Thus, excluding the tax treaty withholding rate from the listing equation, aids in 
separately identifying the holdings equations. 
   
3.2 Results from the model  
  Table 4 reports estimates of our structural model of cross-listing and U.S. holdings.
20  The reported 
estimates are scaled to reflect the median percentage impact on the dependent variable of a one-unit change 
in the explanatory variable (the rescaling procedure is described in the appendix). In the baseline 
specification reported in Panel A, holdings are scaled by market capitalization. Panel B reports the results 
when holdings are scaled by market float. For both of these panels, we estimate the simultaneous model 
using the cross-section of 8,067 stocks for which data on all instruments are available. Panel C of Table 4 
reports results for a specification that is similar to the baseline, except that it includes as a variable the 
                                                       
20 To make our results more readily interpretable, we report rescaled functions of the estimates. Specifically, for the 
coefficients on instruments in the listing decision equation, we calculate the marginal effect of a one-unit change in 
the instrument on the percentage point probability of cross-listing. Similarly, the coefficients in the holdings equations 
are scaled to reflect the marginal effect of a change in the instrument on the holdings share of U.S. investors 
(measured in percentage points). See the appendix for complete details on transformations and on the estimation 
technique.   19 
proportion of a firm’s sales that are foreign. Because this variable is missing from Worldscope in many 
cases, including for most of the financial firms, the results in Panel C exclude these missing cases and omit 
the few remaining financial firms. A total of 5,155 usable observations remain for estimation in Panel C.  
3.2.1 What drives holdings in firms that are not cross-listed? 
 
Results for the holdings equations (4) and (5) appear in the middle columns, starting with the 
estimates from the equation of firms that are not cross-listed. Among firms that are not cross-listed, most of 
the explanatory variables are significant, often with signs that accord with intuition. U.S investors prefer 
firms that are larger, non-financial, included in the MSCI World index, have high market-to-book ratios, 
and pay dividends. They are also attracted to firms from countries that use English as an official language, 
particularly Canadian firms, and firms with low dividend tax withholding rates. The latter result indicates 
that an additional reason that a home bias might exist is that U.S. investors shy away from international 
investments when cross-border dividend withholding rates are high. 
A number of the non cross-listed holdings estimates indicate that U.S. investors are sensitive to the 
amount and quality of information available on foreign-traded firms. Most prominently, the positive and 
statistically significant signs on the accounting variables, measured at both the firm and country level, 
suggest that U.S. investors value high-quality disclosure when choosing a foreign firm in which to invest. 
These findings are consistent with BBM, who show that U.S. investment is higher in firms with greater 
conformity to U.S. GAAP. Our estimates in Panel A of Table 4 suggest that an increase of 20 points in a 
country’s national accounting quality index (CIFAR score), a move on the scale equivalent from going 
from an Austrian firm to a Swedish firm, increases U.S. investment by 0.75 percent of market 
capitalization, holding all else constant. Moving from a value of 2 to 4 on the firm-level accounting quality 
scale increases U.S. investment by a similar account.  Given that U.S. investment averages 3 percent of the 
market capitalization of non-listed firms, these estimates are economically significant.   
Other findings are also consistent with the importance of information quality. The size of the firm 
could proxy for information quality because efficiencies in information production, high regulatory 
oversight, and frequent press coverage are likely to increase the amount of reliable information available on   20 
large firms. Information on companies in English is more readily accessible to the English-speaking U.S. 
public, making them more transparent to U.S. investors.
21  Finally, the tendency to avoid foreign financial 
firms is consistent with a preference for transparency, since evidence suggests that financial firms are less 
transparent than others (Morgan [2002]). 
Some of our estimated coefficients are also consistent with the idea that U.S. investors tend to 
favor familiar foreign stocks. Perhaps the most convincing evidence appears in Panel C, where we find 
larger U.S. holdings for companies with higher foreign sales. However, the economic significance of the 
estimate is small, implying that U.S investors holds 0.009 percentage points (i.e., 0.0018 × 0.5) more in a 
firm with half of its sales abroad, compared with a firm with no foreign sales. 
One puzzling finding is the negative association between holdings and the level of shareholder 
rights protection provided by a firm’s home country. This result holds whether we use the LaPorta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998] index of anti-director rights (as reported), or country-level 
estimates of the blockholder premium in share prices from Dyck and Zingales [2004] (not reported). The 
willingness of American investors to undertake relatively large positions in countries in which minority 
shareholders are vulnerable suggests a relative lack of concern about institutional enforcement of their 
property rights, at least at the time of the 1997 survey.  
The negative sign on the proportion of shares held by insiders is difficult to interpret. It is 
consistent with both a relatively mechanical effect by which closely-held insider shares reduce the supply 
of available float, and with the idea that investors avoid firms in which resources are more likely to be 
diverted to the private benefit of the insiders (Leuz, Lins, and Warnock [2006]). One way to separate the 
two effects—the supply effect and the corporate governance effect—would be to include the insider 
holdings variable in the float-adjusted specifications in Panel B. But doing so induces measurement error 
                                                       
21 Our English-language dummy variable could also capture cross-country institutional differences associated with 
legal origin because the legal system of most English-speaking countries grew out of English common law (see 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998] and Rajan and Zingales [2003]).    21 
with a positive bias, rendering an estimate that is difficult to interpret.
22  This bias, along with the fact that 
our insider holdings variable is a blunt measure that includes the holdings of large, unaffiliated 
shareholders, leads us to exclude insider holdings from the right-hand-side variables in Panel B. 
Finally, the selectivity correction variable most often enters with a statistically insignificant 
estimate. This low significance does not imply that the holdings estimates are free from selection bias. 
Indeed, as documented in Section 4, selection bias can explain 3 to 5 percentage points of the observed 
ownership in cross-listed firms. The lack of significance does suggest that our simultaneous model has low 
power to detect biases associated with unobserved correlation between the holdings and cross-listing 
decisions. When the selectivity correction is significant, as in Panel B, the negative sign implies that the set 
of firms that are unlisted have unobservable characteristics that make their stock less likely to be held by 
U.S. investors. In other words, holding all else constant, the mean holdings of the unlisted sample would be 
higher if the sample were drawn randomly from a group of firms with the same observable characteristics.  
3.2.2 The cross-listing decision and U.S. holdings 
 
In accordance with our intuition about factors that reduce the costs of cross-listing, the estimates in 
Panels A - C reveal that firms are more likely to cross-list on a U.S. exchange if they are large, have better 
home-country accounting standards, or are domiciled in Canada. The two variables that uniquely identify 
the listing equation enter strongly with estimated signs that are in line with our expectations. Turning to the 
impact of holdings on the cross-listing decision, our evidence is mixed. The Panel B (float-adjusted) 
estimates imply that both the expected increase in U.S. investment from cross-listing and the level of U.S. 
holdings prior to listing can positively influence the cross-listing probability. These results are consistent 
                                                       
22 To see this, let i F ˆ  represent our market-float adjusted holdings, i U ˆ  represent the market capitalization (unadjusted) 










Suppose that the insider stake is measured with some error so that  , I I ˆ
i i i h + = where Ii is the insiders’ true stake and 
￿i is some white-noise error. Then, . 0 ) I I ˆ , F F ˆ cov( i i i i > - -   In other words, measurement error in the proportion of 
insider holdings imparts a positive bias on the coefficient estimate in the holdings model when scaled by market float. 
Intuitively, a positive measurement error shock increase the right-hand-side variable (measured proportion of shares 
held by insiders) as it also increases the dependent variable (holdings, by reducing the denominator).    22 
with the idea that firms cross-list to both expand their investor base and service their existing U.S. investor 
base. But the statistical certainty of the positive sign is more tenuous for the estimates in Panels A and C, 
which creates some doubt about the robustness of the results. To some extent, the imprecision in the 
estimates arise because of uncertainty about (H ˆ L), given that the cross-listed holdings equation (4) is 
estimated with relatively few observations.  
 Only a few estimates are significant in the listed holdings equation (4), and our adjusted R
2 ranges 
from 5 to 15 percent. This suggests that U.S. investors have relatively indistinct preferences among cross-
listed firms; among these firms the most important attribute is that they have cross-listed. Only the 
proportion of shares held by insiders, which mainly captures an arithmetic supply effect on the denominator 
of the U.S. holdings share, is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level in the baseline 
specification. Across the other specifications, U.S. investors appear to shy away from financial firms and 
favor high market-to-book firms and firms with extensive foreign sales, even after they have cross-listed. 
 
4. The Cross-Listing Effect 
The remainder of the paper has two goals. First, we estimate the average effect of cross-listing on 
U.S. shareholdings, taking account of the fact that the cross-listing decision represents an endogenous 
choice that cannot be assumed to be independent of investors’ portfolio preferences. Second, we explore 
how the cross-listing effect varies across firms across different types, so that we can make inferences about 
why cross-listing matters. Because the association between cross-listing and U.S. holdings is so strong, 
pinning down the underlying causes of this relationship should offer significant insight into the ultimate 
sources of home bias in investor portfolios.  
4.1 Methodologies to measure the cross-listing effect 
The cross-listing effect cannot be accurately computed using simple comparisons between average 
U.S. holdings of cross-listed firms and non cross-listed firms, because such comparisons are likely to 
overstate the magnitude of the cross-listing effect because of selection bias. Selection bias will exist if, as is   23 
likely, a firm’s propensity to cross-list on a U.S. exchange is correlated with other characteristics of the 
firm that affect U.S. investors’ holding decisions. In particular, firms that cross-list in the United States 
may tend to be the types that U.S. investors would hold anyway, whether they cross-listed or not. 
Our goal in correctly measuring the cross-listing effect is to first estimate the unobservable 
counterfactual of what U.S. holdings would have been in cross-listed firms had they not cross-listed. In this 
case, the average cross-listing effect is an estimate of  




i = - = ,              (8) 
where X is an indicator variable set to one when a firm has cross-listed on a U.S. exchange,  ) 1 X | H ( E
L
i =  
is the expected level of U.S. holdings in cross-listed firm i conditional on it being listed, and  ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i =  
is the expected level of holdings in cross-listed firm i if it had not cross-listed.
23 Statisticians refer to 
equation (8) as a “treatment effect” estimator because it measures the expected effect of treatment X on the 
unit i drawn from some population. 
Corrections for selection bias are themselves subject to specification error (Larcker and Rusticus 
[2005]; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd [1998]; Lalonde [1986]). Therefore, we incorporate three 
different estimators from the labor econometrics literature to robustly measure the average cross-listing 
effect. These estimators also generate firm-specific estimates of the cross-listing effect, which can then be 
used for more in-depth analysis.  
The first estimator is the Heckman [1979]-like estimator from our structural model from Section 3. 
After estimating that model, we estimate  ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i =  by inserting cross-listed firm observations into the 
estimated non cross-listed holdings equation (7) and then averaging over the resulting fitted holdings. 
Our second estimator uses the propensity-score method of matching, also termed “p-matching,” 
originally developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983].
24 P-matching uses fitted cross-listing probabilities 
(“propensity scores”) generated from estimates of equation (3) to match each cross-listed firm with a non 
                                                       
23 One could also estimate the listing impact from the non cross-listed firms, E(HU|X=1) - E(HU|X=0), or from both 
cross-listed and non cross-listed firms to generate an unconditional listing impact, E(H|X=1) - E(H|X=0). Heckman, 
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd [1998] provide a nice overview of issues relating to the different measures. 
24 See Imbens [2004] and Stuart [2004] for recent reviews of matching applications to treatment effect estimators.   24 
cross-listed firm.
25  The idea is that the holdings of p-matched non cross-listed firms are likely to be similar 
to what a listed firm’s holdings would have been if unlisted, so the average holdings of p-matched firms 
can be used to estimate  ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i = . The p-matching estimator requires no explicit model of holdings, 
which reduces the risk of specification error (Drake [1993]; Dehejia and Wahba [2002]; and Zhao [2004]). 
The estimator has also been shown to outperform the Heckman [1979] correction in experimental studies of 
selection bias (Glazerman, Levy, and Myers [2004]). One drawback to the p-matching estimator is that it 
does not account for unobserved correlation between the holdings and cross-listing decisions. 
We generate our third estimate of the average cross-listing effect using the “difference-in-
differences” estimator (Heckman and Robb [1985]; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith [1999]). This estimator 
requires holdings observations on cross-listed firms prior to their cross-listing. For this, we draw upon U.S. 
holdings data from the earlier March 31, 1994 survey. The difference-in-differences estimator compares the 
change in holdings of a firm that was not cross-listed in 1994 but cross-listed by 1997 to firms that 
remained non cross-listed between 1994 and 1997. That is, the cross-listing effect is given by 
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where i indexes a firm that cross-lists between the 1994 and 1997 surveys, j indexes a firm that remains non 
cross-listed in both surveys, and bars over the variables reflect sample means across the i and j categories. 
The difference-in-differences estimator incorporates many of the advantages of the p-matching estimator. 
Moreover, unlike the p-matching estimator, the difference-in-differences estimator accounts for 
unobservable components of selection bias, assuming that the characteristics of a type-i firm do not change 
in a way that is left uncontrolled by the type-j firms.
26  For our application, the key drawback of the 
difference-in-differences estimator is that it relies on a relatively narrow subset of firms (129) that were 
                                                       
25 The asymmetry in our data makes p-matching a particularly attractive method because we have a large set of firms 
from which to select a match (roughly 30 non cross-listed firms for each of our cross-listed firms). 
26 Heckman, Ichimura, Todd, and Smith [1998] provide experimental evidence that difference-in-differences 
estimators outperform both standard Heckman [1979] corrections and p-matching estimators.   25 
traded only in their home market in 1994, but cross-listed by 1997.
27 
4.2 The average cross-listing effect 
Estimates of the average cross-listing effect are summarized in Table 5. Requiring a complete set 
of explanatory variables for the Heckman [1979]-based and p-matching estimators reduces our sample to 
8,067 firms, 279 of which cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. As reported in row 1 of Table 5, at the end of 
1997 U.S. investors held an average of 16.4 percent of the market capitalization of these 279 cross-listed 
firms, an average that is slightly less than for the somewhat larger sample in Table 2. Accordingly, for our 
Heckman-based and p-matching (cross-sectoinal) estimates of the average cross-listing effect, we use 16.4 
percent as our estimate of  ) 1 X | H ( E
L
i = .  
Shown in row 2 of Table 5, the Heckman [1979]-based estimate of  ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i = is 5.6 percent of 
market capitalization. Consistent with selection-bias intuition, the estimate implies that U.S. investors 
would have held a larger mean share of these firms had they not cross-listed than the 2.9 percent average 
holding in firms that were not actually cross-listed (Table 2). Nonetheless, the estimate implies a 
statistically significant, and economically large, average cross-listing effect of 10.8 percent of market 
capitalization (14.7 percent in terms of a firm’s measured float).
28  In other words, the Heckman [1979]-
corrected estimates imply that U.S. holdings in a typical cross-listed stock are 10.8 percentage points higher 
than they would be without the U.S. listing.  
The p-matching and difference-in-differences methodologies produce results that are close to the 
Heckman [1979]-based estimates. As shown in row 4 of Table 5, p-matching produces an estimate of 
) 0 X | H ( E
L
i =  equal to 6.4 percent of market capitalization (9.0 percent of market float), which is higher 
than the corresponding Heckman [1979] estimate, but which still implies a statistically significant listing 
effect equivalent to 10.0 percent of market capitalization (16.3 percent of market float). The bottom panel 
of Table 5 reports U.S. holdings of firms in March 1994 that were not cross-listed but that cross-listed by 
                                                       
27 Because the sample size would be reduced to an even greater extent by requiring insider holdings information, we 
do not report difference-in-differences estimates using the market float measure. 
28 The standard error for the listing effect estimate is calculated as the observation-weighted standard deviation of the 
279 paired differences.   26 
December 1997, amounting to 8.6 percent of market capitalization for the 132 cases in which we had 
holdings data for the earlier period. Adding the 0.6 percentage increase in the holdings of non cross-listed 
firms over the period 1994-1997 yields our highest estimate of  ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i =  -- 9.2 percent of market 
capitalization. Nonetheless, with U.S. investors holding 17.1 percent of these firms by the end of 1997, this 
still implies an average cross-listing effect of 7.9 percent. 
29  Overall, the three techniques estimate the 
average cross-listing effect to range from 8 to 11 percent. 
In results not reported in the tables, we also estimate the average difference between U.S. holdings 
in companies with U.S. Level 1 ADRs and foreign companies not trading in the United States, analogous to 
the average cross-listing effect. Recall from Table 2 that U.S. investors held 8.1 percent of the market 
capitalization of Level 1 ADR-firms. According to the selection-bias estimators, U.S. investors would have 
held between 5 and 6 percent of the shares in these firms anyway, implying a small “Level 1” effect of 2 to 
3 percent of market capitalization. Thus, the greater part of the average cross-listing effect derives from 
benefits associated with the exchange listing itself.   
4.3 Determinants of the cross-listing effect. 
  We conjecture that firms experiencing the largest cross-listing effect are those for which cross-
listing most sharply reduces frictions to investment. If theories linking the importance of cross-listing to 
improved information flow, protection under U.S. laws, and increased familiarity are to have some 
descriptive power, then the largest cross-listing effect should be experienced by firms that (i) have weak 
accounting standards prior to cross-listing, or are financially opaque, (ii) poorly protect outside investors, or 
are from countries with weak investor rights protections, and (iii) have low name-recognition in the United 
States. To explore these implications, we regress firm-level measures of the cross-listing effect on our 
measures of information quality, accounting quality, investor protection, and familiarity. 
                                                       
29 In our sample, 23 of the 129 firms that cross-listed between the two survey dates also undertook seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). It is plausible that the combination of a SEO and cross-listing has different implications for U.S. 
holdings than a cross-listing alone, particularly if the issue targets U.S. investors. However, when we compare the 
change in U.S. holdings for cross-listing stocks with and without these SEOs, we find no statistically significant 
difference. Accordingly, we do not treat cross-listing firms that raise public equity differently from other cross-listing 
firms. For further evidence on the capital-raising behavior of cross-listed firms, see Reese and Weisbach [2002] and 
Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach [2004].   27 
  Our first set of regressions uses cross-listing estimates generated by the Heckman [1979] model. 
The first two columns in Table 6, under the label “Heckman [1979]-based”, report estimates of the 
marginal impact of each instrument on the cross-listing effect. These figures are calculated as the difference 
in the estimates ) ˆ ˆ ( U L b b -  from equations (1) and (2).
30  Estimated p-values of a test that the cross-listed 
and non cross-listed parameters are the same (i.e., their difference is zero) are from bootstrapped 
distributions and are reported in parentheses below the estimates. For the three variables—national 
accounting quality index, firm-level accounting quality index, and English home language home dummy—
that are included in the non cross-listed holdings equation but excluded from the cross-listed holdings, we 
report the bootstrapped p-value and the negative of the estimate from the non cross-listed equation (i.e., we 
assume the coefficient on the excluded variables is the scalar zero). 
The third and fourth columns of Table 6 report the results from regressions using the difference-in-
differences setup to generate firm-level estimates of the cross-listing effect. Specifically, we regress the 
1994 to 1997 change in holdings of stocks that were not cross-listed in 1994 on a cross-listing dummy, its 
interactions with instruments measured as of 1994 and 1997, and the change in the value of instruments 
over the 1994 to 1997 period, 
( )
D








i Z Z - Z ￿ Z ,    (10) 
where Xi equals one if the firm cross-lists in 1997, and zero otherwise. We include changes and first-period 
levels of the instruments in the regression as controls for changes in firm characteristics and in U.S. 
investor preferences, respectively. For brevity, we report only the interaction estimates ( D ￿ ) in Table 6 
which, like the marginal sensitivity estimates from the structural model, identify the marginal influence of 
the instruments on the cross-listing effect.  
Data peculiarities handicap our chances of finding statistically strong relations in the cross-section. 
The parameters of the structural cross-listed holdings equation are measured imprecisely (see Table 4), 
making it difficult to confidently distinguish the signs on the conditional cross-listing effects in the first two 
                                                       
30 The estimates of ￿L and ￿u  are separately reported in Table 4.    28 
columns. Moreover, 1994 firm-level data requirements further reduce the number of cross-listed firms 
available for analysis in the third and fourth columns of the table. 
Nonetheless, several interesting patterns emerge in Table 6. First and foremost, the results are 
consistent with the notion that improvement in the availability and quality of value-relevant information 
about a firm is a key aspect of cross-listing in U.S. markets. In particular, we obtain negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimates for the firm-level accounting quality index in our difference-in-
differences specifications, implying that improved accounting practices linked to cross-listing spurs U.S. 
investment in firms with previously weak accounting standards. Our model-based estimates also imply that 
opacity arising from either weak national accounting standards or uninformative disclosure choices at the 
firm level is a deterrent to U.S. investment in foreign stocks that are not cross-listed. 
Further evidence for the importance of transparency comes in the smaller difference-in-differences 
estimate of the listing effect for Canadian firms. Because Canadian firms are not required to reconcile to 
U.S. GAAP or increase disclosures as much upon cross-listing, cross-listing should have less impact on 
U.S. investors’ willingness to hold Canadian stocks. We also find U.S. holdings react less to cross-listing 
by firms from other English-speaking countries, for which information in English is likely more readily 
available at low cost. One further bit of evidence favoring an information explanation is the reduced listing 
effect for the more liquid stocks that are included in the MSCI World index. To the extent that illiquidity 
reflects asymmetric information between company insiders and other potential traders, as in the models of 
Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] and Easley and O’Hara [2004], the enhanced disclosure requirements 
associated with cross-listing will tend to matter more for less liquid stocks.  
Second, we do not find that U.S. investors respond to the enhanced protections of U.S. securities 
laws in the manner that has been suggested by some proponents of the investor-protection hypothesis. In 
particular, the positive coefficients on the shareholder rights index in the difference-in-differences exercise 
indicate that, all else equal, cross-listing has a smaller impact on U.S. investors’ holdings for firms from 
countries with weaker shareholder protection. Our result here does not imply that U.S. investors fail to 
value shareholder protection provided by other countries’ legal systems, but is consistent with cross-listing   29 
complementing such legal rights. In fact, to the extent that cross-listing in the United States makes a firm 
more transparent, legal protections provided to minority shareholders in the home country may become 
more effective. (Furthermore, the disclosure requirements accompanying a U.S. listing typically include 
information about home-country legal risks that may leave some U.S. investors better informed about their 
rights.)  What our results do suggest is that cross-listing in the United States is not a substitute for adequate 
protection of minority shareholders under the home-country legal system.  
Finally, the results in Table 6 provide relatively little support for the idea that U.S. investors 
increase their weighting in foreign stocks merely because cross-listing makes the names of the underlying 
companies more familiar to the investors. Firms with limited international sales experience no greater 
increase in U.S. holdings than firms with extensive international sales, all else equal. Furthermore, we do 
not find a statistically robust relationship between total firm assets and the cross-listing listing effect.  
4.4 More on trading costs and the cross-listing effect 
The fact that U.S. investors hold large proportions of their shares in the underlying foreign security, 
and that trading in the United States alone (as an over-the-counter stock) does not greatly increase U.S. 
investor interest, indicate that home-market trading costs are unlikely to explain the cross-listing effect. 
Nevertheless, we run several other tests (not reported in tables) to explore whether variation in home-
market transactions costs could impact the cross-listing effect. Specifically, we incorporate into our cross-
sectional regressions proxies for trade and market openness including home-country GDP, home country 
stock market capitalization, a dummy variable separating emerging and industrialized markets, and 




We use a comprehensive 1997 survey of U.S. investor holdings in non-U.S. companies to 
document that cross-listing on a U.S. exchange substantially increases U.S. investor holdings of a foreign 
                                                       
31 These findings are consistent with Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock [2004], who show that measures of barriers-to-
investment explain little of the cross-country holdings patterns of U.S. investors.   30 
stock, a phenomenon we term the “cross-listing effect.”  Our selection bias-corrected estimates imply that 
firms can increase their U.S. holdings by 8 to 11 percent of their market capitalization by cross-listing in 
the United States, doubling or more the amount prior to cross-listing. Of course, this does not imply that 
every firm in the world could obtain a cross-listing effect of this magnitude, but our results suggest that our 
estimates were applicable to at least several hundred firms that were not yet cross-listed.  
We find a smaller U.S. holdings increase from cross-listing for firms with more transparent 
financial accounting. This result is consistent with requisite financial disclosure being a key element of 
cross-listing, from the point of view of U.S. investors. We do not find strong evidence that adopting U.S. 
legal protections is an important aspect of a U.S. listing, but this may be because variation in shareholder 
protection is more difficult to measure in our cross-section of firms than variation in transparency.  
However, our findings are generally consistent with Siegel [2005], who shows that, in practice, U.S. 
securities law enforcement does not extend to cross-listed companies, and Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler 
[2005], who demonstrate that cross-listing does not improve the valuation of companies from poor 
investor-protection countries. 
Despite the large average cross-listing effect on U.S. holdings, results from our simultaneous 
model of the cross-listing and holdings decisions offer only weak support for the idea that prospects for an 
expanded shareholder base are a key motive for cross-listing. We find some evidence that foreign firms are 
more likely to cross-list in the United States when they already have a large base of U.S. shareholders, 
suggesting that some firms cross-list to service their shareholder clientele.  
Our analysis also has policy implications. Firms that voluntarily commit to increased disclosure 
appear to attract more outside investment, and governments can promote and enforce disclosure to attract 
capital flows to their countries. Accordingly, the U.S. cross-listing effect should diminish for firms from 
countries that improve disclosure standards for publicly traded firms.
32  Our results also suggest that legal 
protections for small shareholders may be more effective in an environment that also ensures transparency.   
                                                       
32 Similarly, Armstrong et al. [2006] find that European markets reacted positively to events associated with the 2005 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Europe.   31 
Appendix: Estimating the Structural Model 
 




i H are measured as shares of a firm’s equity value, they are 
well-defined only over the range from zero to one. This implies that (6) and (7) cannot be estimated 
consistently using ordinary least squares because the limited range induces dependence between the 
instruments Zi and the residual.
33  We circumvent this problem by transforming the holdings data by the 
inverse of the logistic function. However, because the inverse logistic is defined only on the open interval 
from zero to one, and we have a number of firms in our sample with no reported U.S. holdings, we shift the 
domain of the inverse logistic to the left by a small fixed amount, S, 
 
). 1 ln( ) ln( ) (
1 S H S H H F - - - + =
-            (A-1) 
 
Figure A-1 graphs the “shifted” F
-1 assuming a shift parameter (S) of 10 percent. A disadvantage of this 
function is that it is only defined for holdings (H) below 90 percent. But it has the favorable property of 
being nearly linear in H between 0 and 80 percent, the range in which most of our observations fall. The 
smoothness of the function reduces the chance that our results will be significantly distorted by some quirk 
of the chosen functional form. After incorporating the inverse shifted logistic transformation, we rewrite 




















i ￿ Z               (A-3) 
 
Lee [1978] proposes a multi-stage method for consistently estimating a system like ours in which a 
first-stage, reduced-form probit generates Heckman [1979]-type correction terms for the holdings equations 
(A-2) and (A-3). The corrected second-stage estimation of the holdings equations produces consistent 
estimates of the relation between the instruments and (transformed) holdings, and makes it possible to 
calculate fitted holdings values as a function of the instruments. The final stage of estimation involves 
using the fitted holdings for estimation of the structural probit in equation (7).  
In order to implement the Lee [1978] estimation framework, we need to make a few additional 
assumptions and a slight modification to our specification. Both of these issues relate to the joint statistical 
distribution of the residuals in the three equations. First, the error terms from the listing equation (
X
i e ) and 




i   ,e e ) must be jointly normally distributed,  






i W e e e                 (A-4) 
where ￿ is a 3 x 3 variance covariance matrix. The second issue arises because the first step in the original 
Lee [1978] procedure involves estimating a reduced form probit for the binary variable into which the 
linear equations for the other dependent variable have been substituted. In our model, equations (A-2) and 
(A-3) are not linear in holdings, thus we must recast the interaction elements in our listing decision 
equation in terms of the transformed holdings variable so that our reduced-form listing equation will be 
tractable. In particular,  
 

















* .    (A-5) 
 
Under assumption (A-4), the probit model implied by equations (A-5), (8), and (9) can be estimated jointly 
with the linear specifications in equations (A-2) and (A-3), as long as certain identification restrictions are 
                                                       
33  See, for example, the introductory discussion of truncated variables in Maddala [1983]. In principal, U.S. holdings 
could be negative, but in practice, short positions are not reflected in the holdings survey. Similarly, with short 
positions held by others, it is conceivable that H could exceed 1, but in practice it is below 0.9.   32 
met. Lee [1978] has shown that multi-stage estimation will produce estimates of structural parameters that 
are consistent in the presence of selection bias.  
One advantage of this framework is that although we only observe
L
i H for firms that have a U.S. 
listing and
U
i H for firms that do not, we can use our parameter estimates to make inferences about what U.S. 
holdings of a firm’s stock would have been had the firm made the counterfactual choice about whether to 
cross-list. Furthermore, we can generate estimates of the cross-listing effect—i.e., the impact of cross-




i H )—either unconditionally or conditional on specific firm characteristics. 
  In the first stage of the Lee [1978] methodology, the two holdings equations (A-2) and (A-3) are 
substituted into the listing probit (A-5) to form a reduced-form listing equation that can be estimated on a 
stand-alone basis by numerical maximum likelihood. The set of independent variables (Z
R) for the first-
stage reduced-form probit specification consists of all of the instruments in the structural equations for 
listing and holdings: 
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The estimates from the probit model embodied in equations (A-7), (A-8), and (A-9) can be used to 
construct the selectivity-bias correction in the holdings-equations residuals (￿
L and ￿
U). It can be shown that 
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where the variance of ￿
X has been normalized to one and ￿ and ￿ denote the probability density function 
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is often referred to as the “inverse Mills ratio”. Estimates of the ratio form the basis for standard corrections 
for selectivity bias when inclusion in an estimation sample is contingent on a discrete outcome (see 
Heckman [1979] or Maddala [1983]). Intuitively, the inverse Mills ratio accounts for the unobserved 
correlation between the listing decision and holdings. There is also a similar, but less frequently used 
correction for selectivity bias for the non-selected observations, 
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The second stage of the Lee procedure involves estimating the holdings equations by ordinary least squares 
by rewriting them as 

















Z ) H ( F h + l
b + a F
b + a f
- b + a =
-         (A-12)   
and  
.
) Z ( 1
) Z (














1 h + l
b + a F -
b + a f
+ b + a =
-         (A-13) 
 








i = < h = ³ h  We use our first-stage 
estimates of the parameters ￿R and ￿R in (A-12) to construct the selectivity variables, and then substitute 
these variables into equations (A-12) and (A-13). The coefficient associated with the selectivity adjustment 
provides an estimate of the unobserved covariance between the listing decision and each of the holding 
equations. The final stage of the Lee procedure involves using the consistent estimates of ￿L, ￿U, ￿L, and ￿U 
from (A-12) and (A-13) to construct fitted values of (F
-1) using the original holdings equations (A-12) and 
(A-13). The fitted holdings are inserted back into the structural listing decision equation (A-5), which is 
then estimated as a probit model via numerical likelihood maximization. 
As noted by Lee [1978], it is possible to construct consistent standard errors for equations (A-12) 
and (A-13) after making a correction for heteroscedasticity associated with the selectivity terms. However, 
inferences about the distribution of the estimated parameters in the listing decision equation (A-5) are 
complicated by the use of the generated variables E(F
-1|Z) in the final-stage probit estimation. Furthermore, 
for judgments about how the cross-listing effect on U.S. holdings varies across different types of firms (i.e., 
the conditional cross-listing effect), we construct statistics that involve parameter estimates from more than 
one equation. Accordingly, we opt to estimate the distribution of the full set of model parameters via non-
parametric bootstrap simulations. Specifically, for each of the three versions of the model we estimated, we 
randomly drew 1,000 hypothetical samples with the same number of observations (with replacement), re-
estimating the full model and computing the statistics of interest with each simulation. 
Because our structural equations (A-5), (A-12), and (A-13) are nonlinear, the estimated parameters 
of the model are difficult to interpret. Therefore, we report rescaled functions of the estimates that are more 
readily interpretable. Specifically, for the coefficients on instruments in the listing decision equation, we 
calculate the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the instrument on the percentage point probability of 
cross-listing, estimated using each of 8,067 firms in the sample (or the 5,155 firms used in Panel C),  
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We then report in Table 6 the median of the marginal effect estimates. The formulae for scaling the 
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The reported figures represent the median marginal impact on the cross-listing probability of changes in 
(H
L-H
U ) and in (H
U), all else equal. The extra term in (22) reflects the fact that a unit change in (H
U ) with 
(H
L-H
U ) held constant implies a unit change in (H
L).  
Similarly, the coefficients (￿ ˆ ) in the holdings equations are scaled to reflect the marginal effect of   34 
a change in the instrument on the holdings share of U.S. investors (measured in percentage points), 
 
( ) ( ) } U , L { C                   , 0 F               , ˆ ˆ ˆ F 100 Î > · ¢ * + a ¢ * C C i C ￿ ￿ Z .       (A-18) 
 
We then report the median estimated effect, which varies with the slope of the logistic transformation 
function (F).    35 
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Table 1:  U.S. Holdings by Country, December 31, 1997 
 
The table shows the proportion of market capitalization held by U.S. investors and the number of firms 
with positive U.S. holdings among the 12,236 non-U.S. stocks in our sample, sorted by country. Data on 
the value of U.S. holdings are from the U.S. Treasury/Federal Reserve Board survey of U.S. holdings of 









Firms with  
Positive U.S. 








Firms with  
Positive U.S. 
Holdings  
Argentina   24  38  Korea   10  248 
Australia   10  268  Luxembourg   8  8 
Austria   8  54  Malaysia   5  348 
Belgium   4  66  Mexico   19  83 
Brazil   13  128  Netherlands   19  136 
Canada   11  484  New Zealand   14  47 
Chile   7  63  Norway   13  120 
China   4  85  Pakistan   12  42 
Colombia   4  17  Peru   18  20 
Czech Republic   5  41  Philippines   9  96 
Denmark   8  88  Poland   17  39 
Finland   21  74  Portugal   13  50 
France   11  403  Russia   9  20 
Germany   6  271  Singapore   7  162 
Greece   4  64  South Africa   5  150 
Hong Kong   7  332  Spain   11  104 
Hungary   21  19  Sweden   14  153 
India   6  186  Switzerland   11  144 
Indonesia   8  107  Taiwan   1  174 
Ireland   21  56  Thailand   9  192 
Israel   11  49  Turkey   9  77 
Italy   10  143  United 
Kingdom 
10  1,446 
Japan   6  1,876  Venezuela   14  14 
      Total  9  8,785   41 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Sample, December 31, 1997  
 
The table reports aggregate U.S. holdings, the number and market capitalization of the sample firms, and 
U.S. holdings in cross-listed and non cross-listed firms. Data on the value of U.S. holdings are from the 
U.S. Treasury/Federal Reserve Board survey of U.S. holdings of foreign securities. Market capitalization 
figures and are from Worldscope. We calculate market float by scaling market capitalization down by the 
figure given in Worldscope’s “closely held share” field. We label a non-U.S. firm as cross-listed if its 
shares are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Level 1 ADRs trade only on over-the-counter 
markets and are not considered to be cross-listed on a U.S. exchange. 
 
 
  Firm Market 
Capitalization 
Available  





Number of Firms Available  12,236  8,528 
     
Total market value of equity (billions of US$)  $11,080  $5,927 
     
Value of U.S. holdings (billions of US$)   $1,020  $802 
      Implicit share held by U.S. investors   9.2%  13.5% 
     
     
     
Firms Cross-Listed on a U.S. Exchange  498  293 
     
Average share held by U.S. investors  17.5%  26.3% 
     
Average share held in ADR form  6.4%  12.4% 
     
     
     
All Firms Not Cross-Listed on U.S. Exchange  11,738  8,235 
     
Average share held by U.S. investors  2.9%  5.6% 
     
     
Memo:     
    Firms underlying Level 1 ADRs  672  524 
    Average share held by U.S. investors  8.1%  14.6% 
    Average share held in ADR form  1.7%  2.8% 
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Table 3 
Variables and Instruments 
 
This table provides definitions and sources for the explanatory variables used in the sample selection 
corrections, the cross-sectional regressions, and the simultaneous model of U.S. holdings and the cross-
listing decision.  
 
Variable  Definition  Included in: 
     
Firm-level variables     
Total assets 
    
Logarithm of the 1997 book value of a firm’s 
assets from Worldscope, included as a 









i Z  
     
Financial firm dummy  Dummy variable that takes on the value of 
one when a firm is identified by Worldscope 










i Z  
     
Proportion of shares held by 
insiders (%) 
Worldscope’s 1997 value for the number of 
closely held shares as a percentage of 
common shares outstanding, adjusted to 
remove those stakes mistakenly counted as 
insider ownership by Worldscope. These 
include holdings by the Bank of New York, 
Morgan Guarantee Trust, and Citibank, 
because these shares are holdings for ADR 










i Z  
     
MSCI index membership dummy  Dummy variable equal to one when a firm is 
included as a member of the MSCI All-







i Z  
     
Dummy for dividend-paying firm  Dummy variable equal to one when a firm 








i Z  
     
Market-to-book value ratio  Year-end closing share price divided by the 
per-share book value of equity in 1997, as 







i Z  
     
Foreign sales as a proportion of 
total sales (%) 
Proportion of sales generated from operations 
in foreign countries relative to total sales in 
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Table 3 (continued):  Variables and Instruments. 
Variable  Definition  Included in: 










i Z  
     
Firm-level accounting 
quality index 
Index ranging from zero to four, calculated 
using criteria from Aggarwal, Klapper, and 
Wysocki [2003]. Four components takes a 
value of one if the firm (1)  used a BigSix 
auditor, (2) received a clean audit report, (3) 
used international accounting standards or US 
GAAP, and (4) reported consolidated 






i Z  
     
Country-level variables     
Home-country trading 
value/GDP(%) 
1997 dollar volume of trading in the home 
market of a firm, normalized by the dollar 
value of the country’s 1997 gross domestic 
product (GDP).  The volume data are 
obtained from the International Finance 
Corporation [1998] and the GDP figures are 
collected from the International Monetary 





i Z    
     
Home-country dividend 
withholding tax rate 
faced by U.S. investors 
For countries maintaining a bilateral tax treaty 
with the United States, we use the treaty tax 
rate, as reported in the IRS publication 901, 
U.S. Tax Treaties. For countries with no U.S. 
tax treaty, we calculate dividend withholding 
rates from 1997 gross and net dividend 
payments to holders of ADRs, as reported in 







i Z  
     
Germanic home language 
dummy 
Dummy variable set equal to one for firms 
domiciled in a country in which a Germanic 
language—Danish, Dutch, English, German, 






i Z    
     
English home language 
dummy 
Dummy variable that equals one if the 
company’s domicile is a country in which 





i Z    44 
Table 3 (continued):  Variables and Instruments. 
Variable  Definition  Included in: 
National accounting quality 
index 
Values for 1995 reported by Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith [2004]. Compiled by the 
Center for Financial Analysis and Research, 
the index averages across firms within a given 
country the number of items, out of a possible 
maximum of 90, that are included as part of a 
firm’s financial statements. 
,  
R




i Z  
     
Shareholder rights index  Calculated by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny [1998]. Index takes on a 
value between 0 and 6 depending on how 
many of the following applies to a country’s 
equity market: percentage of outstanding 
shares required to call an extraordinary 
meeting less than or equal to 10 percent, 
cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minority interests on board, 
voting by mail permitted, mechanisms in 
place for oppressed minority investors, 
preemptive right that can only be waived by a 
shareholder vote, and protection of 
shareholders from requirements that shares be 







i Z  
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Table 4:  Jointly Estimating U.S. Holdings Behavior and Cross-listing Decision 
 
The table reports estimates of a simultaneous system that includes a probit specification of a firm’s decision 
to cross-list and two equations that determine the holdings by U.S. investors—one conditional on cross-
listing on a U.S. exchange as of December 31, 1997, and one conditional on not cross-listing. The 
dependent variable in the latter two equations is a nonlinear transformation of U.S. holdings in a given 
company, scaled by either the company’s market capitalization or market float (the appendix describes the 
transformation). For ease of exposition, the estimated slope coefficients are rescaled as follows:  (1) For the 
cross-listing equation, the reported figures are scaled to reflect the marginal impact on the percent 
probability of listing of a unit change in the variable in question. The marginal impact reported is the 
median impact over the firms in the sample; (2) For the U.S. holdings equations, the reported figures are 
scaled to reflect the marginal impact on the percent of shares held of a unit change in the variable in 
question. Again, the marginal impact reported is the median impact over the firms in the sample (whether 
listed or not). The Gain in U.S. Holdings Share from Cross-Listing (%) is the endogenously estimated 
forecast of the change in holdings resulting from cross-listing. The U.S. Holdings Share without Cross-
Listing (%) is the endogenously determined estimate of what U.S. holdings would be if a firm does not 
cross-list. The other variables, which are assumed exogenous to the system, are defined in Table 3. 
Bootstrapped p-values corresponding to a null hypothesis of a zero median impact appear in parentheses 
below each reported figure.    46 
Table 4 (continued): Jointly Estimating U.S. Holdings Behavior and Cross-listing Decision 
 
Panel A: Baseline  U.S. Holdings Share (%) of Market Cap. If: 
 
Cross-Listing 
% Probability  Not Cross-Listed  Cross-Listed  Difference 
0.210        Gain in U.S. Holdings Share  
from Cross-Listing (%)  (0.212)       
          0.555        U.S. Holdings Share 
 without Cross-Listing (%)  (0.054)       
          -0.811        Home-country trading volume/GDP 
(0.004)       
          0.541        Germanic home language dummy 
(0.020)       
          0.034  -0.024  -0.155  -0.131  Proportion of Shares Held  
by Insiders (%)  (0.225)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          -1.851  -0.964  -0.163  0.801  Financial firm dummy 
(0.008)  (0.000)  (0.523)  (0.351) 
          3.729  0.483  -0.324  -0.811  Canada dummy 
(0.002)  (0.186)  (0.449)  (0.379) 
          0.466  0.261  -0.164  -0.427  Log2 of total assets 
(0.007)  (0.000)  (0.332)  (0.144) 
          0.117  0.036      National accounting quality index 
(0.001)  (0.001)     
            0.008  0.060  0.052  Market value/Book value 
  (0.020)  (0.133)  (0.189) 
            3.202  -1.358  -4.575  MSCI member dummy 
  (0.000)  (0.232)  (0.002) 
            -0.419  -0.679  -0.254  Shareholder rights index 
  (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.271) 
            0.631  -1.947  -2.600  Dummy for dividend-paying firms 
  (0.000)  (0.307)  (0.234) 
            -0.056  -0.006  0.050  Home-country dividend withholding 
tax rate faced by U.S. investors    (0.000)  (0.464)  (0.315) 
            0.379      Firm-level accounting quality index 
  (0.000)     
            0.904      English home language dummy 
  (0.000)     
            0.105  -0.125    Selectivity correction (normalized  
by its own standard deviation)    (0.130)  (0.515)   
          Adjusted R-squared  0.26  0.26  0.10   
          Number of observations  8067  7788 
 
279   
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Table 4 (continued): Jointly Estimating U.S. Holdings Behavior and Cross-listing Decision 
 
Panel B: Float-Adjusted  U.S. Holdings Share (%) of Market Float  if: 
 
Cross-Listing 
% Probability  Not Cross-
Listed 
Cross-Listed  Difference 
0.152        Gain in U.S. Holdings Share  
From Cross-Listing (%)  (0.035)       
          0.375        U.S. Holdings Share 
 without Cross-Listing (%)  (0.011)       
          -0.805        Home-country trading volume/GDP 
(0.002)       
          0.482        Germanic home language dummy 
(0.074)       
          -0.006        Proportion of Share Held  
by Insiders (%)  (0.057       
          -0.768  -1.968  -5.819  -3.773  Financial firm dummy 
(0.111  (0.000)  (0.069)  (0.146) 
          2.576  2.431  -0.180  -2.613  Canada dummy 
(0.001)  (0.021)  (0.443)  (0.209) 
          0.253  0.602  0.806  0.183  Log2 of total assets 
(0.018)  (0.000)  (0.177)  (0.460) 
          0.101  0.000      National accounting quality index 
(0.000)  (0.546)     
            0.017  0.091  0.073  Market value/Book value 
  (0.006)  (0.032)  (0.098) 
            5.395  -2.321  -7.772  MSCI member dummy 
  (0.000)  (0.157)  (0.000) 
            -0.717  0.006  0.723  Shareholder rights index 
  (0.000)  (0.590)  (0.303) 
            0.974  -6.431  -7.478  Dummy for dividend-paying firms 
  (0.000)  (0.066)  (0.037) 
            -0.077  0.041  0.119  Home-country dividend withholding 
tax rate faced by U.S. investors    (0.000)  (0.407)  (0.266) 
            0.803      Firm-level accounting quality index 
  (0.000)     
            2.555      English home language dummy 
  (0.000)     
            -0.368  -3.438    Selectivity correction (normalized  
by its own standard deviation)    (0.037)  (0.102)   
          Adjusted R-squared  0.28  0.20  0.05   
          Number of observations  8067  7788  279   
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Table 4 (continued): Jointly Estimating U.S. Holdings Behavior and Cross-listing Decision 
 
Panel C: Non-financial  U.S. Holdings Share (%) of Market Cap. if: 
 
Cross-Listing 
% Probability  Not Cross-Listed  Cross-Listed  Difference 
0.109        Gain in U.S. Holdings Share  
from Cross-Listing (%)  (0.174)       
          0.229        U.S. Holdings Share 
 without Cross-Listing (%)  (0.129)       
          -0.839        Home-country trading volume/GDP 
(0.002)       
          0.977        Germanic home language dummy 
(0.001)       
          0.012  -0.027  -0.137  -0.109  Proportion of Share Held  
By Insiders (%)  (0.265)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
          0.007  0.018  0.051  0.033  Foreign sales as a proportion of total 
sales (%)  (0.193)  (0.000)  (0.050)  (0.117) 
          2.592  0.394  1.013  -0.607  Canada dummy 
(0.016)  (0.315)  (0.410)  (0.453) 
          0.432  0.338  0.090  -0.248  Log2 of total assets 
(0.010)  (0.000)  (0.479)  (0.282) 
          0.055  0.025      National accounting quality index 
(0.012)  (0.036)     
            0.008  0.115  0.108  Market value/Book value 
  (0.031)  (0.101)  (0.123) 
            3.178  -2.165  -5.364  MSCI member dummy 
  (0.000)  (0.186)  (0.003) 
            -0.408  0.139  0.548  Shareholder rights index 
  (0.000)  (0.439)  (0.256) 
            0.703  -1.057  -1.770  Dummy for dividend-paying firms 
  (0.000)  (0.406)  (0.323) 
            -0.039  -0.276  -0.235  Home-country dividend withholding 
tax rate faced by U.S. investors    (0.000)  (0.095)  (0.128) 
            0.204      Firm-level accounting quality index 
  (0.001)     
            1.029      English home language dummy 
  (0.000)     
            -0.062  -0.199    Selectivity correction (normalized  
By its own standard deviation)    (0.313)  (0.496)   
          Adjusted R-squared  0.30  0.26  0.14   
          Number of observations  5155  4970  185   
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Table 5:  Average Cross-Listing Effect for Cross-Listed Stocks  
 
The table reports estimates of the average cross-listing effect across 279 cross-listed firms using three 
alternative treatment estimators. The “Heckman-based” estimates (rows 2 and 3 of Panel A) are based on 
fitted holdings from the non cross-listed holdings equation (4) using data on the cross-listed firms. 
Parameter estimates for these equations appear in the second column of the first two panels of Table 4. The 
“p-matching” estimates (rows 4 and 5) are U.S. holdings of a sample of non cross-listed firms that have 
been paired with the cross-listed sample on the basis of fitted probabilities from a reduced-from probit 
model of the cross-listing decision. Panel B presents “differences-in-differences” estimates using data on 
U.S. holdings for March 31, 1994 and December 31, 1997. The sample in Panel B is restricted to stocks 
that were not cross-listed in U.S. markets in the earlier period, with the columns distinguishing between 
stocks that cross-listed before the second period and those that did not. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Heckman-based and P-Matching Methods  U.S. investors’ aggregate holdings as percentage of: 
  Market capitalization  Market Float 
1. Mean holdings of cross-listed stocks, 
) 1 | ( = X H E
L
i  
16.4  25.3 
     
2. Heckman-based estimate of   ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i =     5.6   10.5 
     
3. Heckman-based estimate of cross-listing effect, 








  (1.2) 
     
4. P-matching estimate of   ) 0 X | H ( E
L
i =    6.4  9.0 
     
5. P-Matching estimate of cross-listing effect, 










Panel B: Difference-in-Differences   Stocks Cross-listed  on U.S. 
exchange by December 1997 
Stocks not Cross-listed  on U.S. 
exchange by December 1997 
6. Holdings:  March 31, 1994  8.6  2.3 
     
7. Holdings:  December 31, 1997  17.1  2.9 
     
8. Change in holdings (1994-1997)  8.5  0.6 
     
9. Difference-in-differences 
estimate of cross-listing effect 







   
10. Number of Observations  132  9479 
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Table 6:  Determinants of Cross-Listing Effect 
The table reports cross-sectional analyses of firm-level estimates of the cross-listing effect as a function of 
firm and country instruments. The Heckman [1979]-based estimates are calculated as the difference 
between the second and third columns of Table 4 in panels A and C. Reported in the difference-in-
differences columns are coefficient estimates from a regression of the change in U.S. holdings (as a 
percentage of market capitalization) between March 31, 1994 and December 31, 1997 on a cross-listing 
dummy interacted with 1994 values of the instrument. The sample is restricted to stocks that were not 
cross-listed in U.S. markets in the earlier period. A dummy variable for cross-listing between 1994 and 
1997, first-period values of the instruments, and changes in the instruments (between the first and second 
period) are included as control variables, in addition to the reported interactions between the instruments 
and cross-listing. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
  Heckman [1979]-based  Differences-in-differences 
  Baseline  Non-financial     
-0.131  -0.109      Proportion of Shares Held  
by Insiders (%)  (0.000)  (0.002)     
          0.801    -6.879  -5.123  Financial firm dummy 
(0.351)    (0.000)  (0.003) 
          -0.811  -0.607  -6.660  -3.634  Canada dummy 
(0.379)  (0.453)  (0.000)  (0.112) 
          -0.427  -0.248    -0.549  Log2 of total assets 
(0.144)  (0.282)    (0.021) 
          -0.036  -0.025  -0.041  0.169  National accounting quality index 
(0.000)††  (0.036) ††  (0.732)  (0.181) 
          0.052  0.108    -0.549  Market value/Book value 
(0.189)  (0.123)    (0.000) 
          -4.575  -5.364  -3.237  -2.190  MSCI member dummy 
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.029)  (0.140) 
          -0.254  0.548  2.738  2.714  Shareholder rights index 
(0.271)  (0.256)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          -2.600  -1.770    1.127  Dummy for dividend-paying firms 
(0.234)  (0.323)    (0.483) 
          0.050  -0.235      Home-country dividend withholding 
tax rate faced by U.S. investors  (0.315)  (0.128)     
          -0.379  -0.204  -2.018  -3.103  Firm-level accounting quality index 
(0.000)††  (0.001)††  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          -0.904  -1.029  -3.682  -7.874  English home language dummy 
(0.000)††  (0.000)††  (0.060)  (0.001) 
            0.033      Foreign Sales as a proportion of total 
sales (%)    (0.117)     
                    Number Not Cross-Listed  7788  4970  9195  7285 
Number Cross-Listed 
 
279  185  128  96 
          Adjusted R-squared      0.05  0.05 
††Standard errors are from “not cross-listed” specification in Table 4 under the assumption that the cross-listed 
coefficients equal zero.   51 
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